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READERS of Nietzsche are familiar with his position that the truth 
expressed in language is illusory. From this point of view, language 
fails to correspond to reality and the belief that it does so is part of the 
metaphysical chimera that we can know the nature of things. Moreover, 
Nietzsche states that the inﬂexibility of language means that it fails to 
adequately communicate diverse and changing experiences. But given 
Nietzsche’s own commitment to writing I think it is worth paying close 
attention to another strand of Nietzsche’s thought about language that is 
far more optimistic about what it can accomplish—his writings on style. 
An examination of Nietzsche’s stylistics has long been thought 
necessary for understanding his thought. In addition to his virtuosic use 
of many styles, Nietzsche wrote explicitly about style and this writing 
is my focus here. Placing his comments on style in the broader context 
of his philosophy of language shows that language’s relationship to 
experience involves more than simply a failure to express or communicate 
it. Nietzsche’s thoughts about style imply that there are various important 
connections between experience and language. Taking style seriously, I 
maintain, requires that language needs to be experienced in order to be 
understood. It also requires us to think about the relationship between 
language and our ethos, as well as apprehend a particular notion of the 
experience of writing. A consideration of these multiple connections 
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between style, language and experience helps us understand our use of 
language and, given the risks and failures of language, appreciate why 
Nietzsche dedicated himself to writing.
I
Nietzsche writes that language is a consequence of collective living, 
which instigates a need for communication. For individuals to live 
together there must be an agreement on what words mean and thus “a 
uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things”.1 The 
use of linguistic norms comes to be perceived as the upholding of truth, 
rather than adherence to convention and humanity “forgets that the 
original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the 
things themselves” (PT, p. 86). According to this account, language has a 
metaphorical relationship to the world and its origins lie in the group, or 
what Nietzsche calls the “herd”. So he writes in Twilight of the Idols: “Speech, 
it seems, was devised only for the average, medium, communicable. The 
speaker has already vulgarized himself by speaking”.2
In “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense”, Nietzsche writes that 
words project similarity and constancy onto diverse experiences. The 
assumption that the different experiences to which one word applies 
are in some respect the same means that words fail to respond to the 
diversity and ﬂux of experience. Language effaces the distinctiveness of 
individual experiences, a process that is epitomized in the formation of 
concepts that apply to many different experiences (PT, p. 83). Ideas are 
embedded in the generalities of language and project unity and structure 
upon the world.3 Even grammatical structures encourage particular ways 
of thinking by relating concepts to each other in certain ways.4 Language’s 
projection of similarity on singular experiences by means of the concept 
elides the diversity and unfamiliarity of experiences. This imposition of 
likeness on different experiences can mislead language users to conclude 
that the same word designates the same experience for different people. 
But the utility of language’s structures does not mean that they are real, 
and Nietzsche writes of how, in the study of antiquity, we “are deceived 
by a similarity of words and concepts: but behind them there always lies 
concealed a sensation which has to be foreign”.5
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 Yet I consider Nietzsche’s thought about the relationship 
between words and experience to be more complex than simply the idea 
that words efface singular experiences. While in some passages of “On 
Truth and Lies in Non-moral Sense” he writes that experience is prior 
to language and independent of it (PT, pp. 90-91), other passages and 
later writings maintain that conscious experience is determined by the 
words we have for it. All that is consciously experienced is done so in 
terms of already circulating words and their implicit concepts (PT, p. 
89). Conscious experience is shaped by the concepts inherent in words, 
that is, the generalities, unities and relationships implicit in them.6 This 
idea that the meaning that language projects upon experience comes to 
fashion conscious experience has, it is widely known, been discussed 
by subsequent theorists inﬂuenced by Nietzsche, such as Barthes and 
Foucault. But it raises the question of how it is possible for unusual, 
changing and rareﬁed experiences to be expressed in language, given 
that the norms projected by language on experience form our conscious 
experience. Pursuing this question will lead us to lesser-known aspects 
of Nietzsche’s thought about language.
II
Nietzsche conceives of style as countering the way in which the 
concepts inherent to words homogenize meaning and, by doing so, he 
provides an antidote to the writer’s entanglement in uniformity. Style—the 
way in which something is said or written, its rhythm, tone, polysemy, 
tempo, phrasing, temporal order and so on—constitutes the meaning of 
what is expressed: “There is art in every good sentence—art that must 
be ﬁgured out if the sentence is to be understood!  A misunderstanding 
about its tempo, for example: and the sentence itself is misunderstood” 
(BGE, p. 178). Thinking of style as an essential part of meaning rejects the 
idea that style is merely an elaboration overlaid on a stable meaning or 
content. A lack of a consideration of the style of a whole work, a meager 
focus on individual words and concepts, is a sign of decadence according 
to Nietzsche:
For the present I merely dwell on the question of style.—What is the sign 
of every literary decadence?  That life no longer dwells in the whole. The 
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word becomes sovereign and leaps out of the sentence, the sentence reaches 
out and obscures the meaning of the page, the page gains life at the expense 
of the whole.7
Ignoring style is the cause not only of decadence in writing, but 
also of decadence in reading because attention to style is necessary for 
understanding the meaning of any piece of writing. Consequently, I 
want to consider the consequences of taking seriously the notion that 
style contributes to meaning, and examine how style enables language to 
challenge its own inclinations towards generality and uniformity. 
Firstly, considering style as intrinsic to meaning requires us to view 
language as something to be experienced, rather than simply understood. 
In discussing the way in which Nietzsche’s ideas are tied to his style, Bernd 
Magnus, Stanley Stewart and Jean-Pierre Mileur describe his writing as 
“resisting paraphrase”. If a piece of writing resists paraphrase, then its 
meaning is generated by a particular use of language and not through 
correspondence with an external state of affairs that remains a constant 
source of meaning. A piece of writing that cannot be paraphrased gains 
its meaning by virtue of qualities within language itself. Tampering with 
style through altering tempo, rhythm and tension will change meaning. In 
this way writings are unique objects whereby any process of substitution 
changes the meaning to a greater or lesser degree. Magnus, Stewart 
and Mileur describe this as “tokening”, suggesting that “most of his 
[Nietzsche’s] published writings virtually embody the theses for which 
they argue, they represent incarnate their thought, they are instances 
of their own kind, tokens of their own type; they are self-referring 
simulacra”.8
If the style, and thus the meaning, of writing cannot be captured by 
paraphrase, then a particular piece of language needs to experienced in 
order to be understood. Stanley Fish describes reading as an experience, 
as something that happens to oneself, noting the way in which a 
sentence’s:
refusal to yield a declarative statement—has been transformed into an 
account of its experience (not being able to get a fact out of it). It is no 
longer an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something that happens 
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to, and with the participation of the reader. And it is this event, this 
happening—all of it and not anything that could be said about it or any 
information one might take away from it—that is, I would argue, the 
meaning of the sentence.9
Nietzsche himself comments on how texts are things to be experienced. 
Contemplating on his own success as a writer in Ecce Homo he writes: 
“What I am today, where I am today—at a height where I speak no longer 
with words but with lightning bolts.... Here every word is experienced”.10 
Elsewhere he asks “whether anyone who has never lived through similar 
experiences could be brought closer to the experience of this book by means 
of prefaces” (GS, p. 32). The experience of style, it seems, takes language 
beyond vulgar uniformity and simplistic ideas about the relationship 
between words and experience. 
III
The idea of stylistic language as self-referential language, as thought 
incarnate, might be thought to sit uneasily alongside some of Nietzsche’s 
other comments on the relationship between style and experience, 
although I hope to establish that this is not the case. In outlining Nietzsche’s 
criticisms of the correspondence theory of language I discussed his idea 
that there is a tendency in language users to assume that the same word 
designates a similar experience for different people, when this may not 
necessarily be so. As mentioned previously, it is this misleading inclination 
that Nietzsche is warning us to beware of when studying the ancients. For 
Nietzsche, different groups of people are tied to different ethoi, united by 
shared habits, conventions, languages, mores and, indeed, experiences. 
This means that language use is tied to particular, shared ways of life:
Words are sounds designating concepts; concepts, however, are more or less 
deﬁnite images designating frequently recurring and associated sensations, 
groups of sensations. To understand one another it is not sufﬁcient to 
employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate 
the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our 
experiences in common. (BGE, p. 205)11
This suggests that while a language mediates conscious experience it 
does not do so in the same way for all people that use it. It rightly notes 
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that the same language is often used by a variety of people, for example 
modern scholars reading ancient Greek, who may attribute different 
meanings to the same word. While “conscious thinking takes the form of 
words” (GS, p. 299), the question of style means that people who share 
the same language do not necessarily have the same experiences.
The way in which people use language—their style—is closely related 
to the particularities of their experience. To ignore the style of language is 
to misunderstand it and project the similarities and generalities inherent 
in one’s language or thought onto another’s. Bad translation exempliﬁes 
these errors (GS, p. 137). While it is possible to translate concepts associated 
with words between languages, the particular styles of different languages 
(and therefore the speciﬁcity of concepts) are not easily translated (BGE, 
p. 59). Those who have the greatest mastery of style in a society reﬂect 
the dominant practices of a people, for example, Christian preachers in 
nineteenth-century Germany (BGE, p. 180). Nietzsche tells realists who 
insist on the objectivity of language, on its correspondence with the real 
world, to “forget your descent, your past, your training” (GS, p. 121), that 
is, to forget themselves as part of a particular linguistic tradition with a 
distinct style.
Style is language shaping experiences in particular and peculiar ways, 
despite the concepts inherent in words that translate between circumstances. 
To focus on the signiﬁcance of style is to acknowledge that languages not 
only generate generality and similarity, but also embody speciﬁcities 
of meaning, ethos and experience. In relating language back to speciﬁc 
experiences and contexts, style works against language’s tendency towards 
generality and universality. This capacity for speciﬁcity has important 
consequences for our ideas about what constitutes good writing. 
Nietzsche obviously considers his art of style as essential to the merit 
of his writing. Moreover, he relates this art of style to his own inward 
experiences, writing:
a general remark about my art of style. To communicate a state, an inward 
tension of pathos, by means of signs, including the tempo of these signs—
that is the meaning of every style; and considering that the multiplicity 
of inward states is exceptionally large in my case, I have many stylistic 
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possibilities—the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the 
disposal of one man. Good is any style that really communicates an inward 
state, that makes no mistake about the signs, the tempo of the signs, the 
gestures—all the laws about long periods are concerned with the art of 
gestures. Here my instinct is infallible. (EH, p. 265)
Nietzsche’s faultless talent for style, he declares, is related to the 
breadth of his inner states because a diversity of inner experience is tied 
to a diversity of ways of using language. To be familiar with a diversity 
of styles is to be familiar with the different experiences they cultivate. 
Nietzsche’s recognition of the way in which experiences are shaped by 
the peculiarities and particularities of different language use gives him 
stylistic breadth and rhetorical repertoire. 
A writer such as Nietzsche deploys a variety of styles for strategic 
reasons. Magnus, Stewart and Mileur discuss the complexities of his use 
of the discourses of the gospel, and prophetic and pastoral traditions for 
writing Zarathustra.12 Nietzsche presents unfamiliar ideas through highly 
reﬁned and familiar forms, such as nineteenth-century German literature. 
Although such a use of styles tells us that Nietzsche understood these 
styles and their associated experiences, one should not make the error of 
wholly identifying him or his experiences with these styles (HH, pp. 94, 
248). Rather, as I discuss in more detail below, his strategic deployment 
of style takes up a perspective on the normative experiences associated 
with the languages and styles surrounding him, and comments upon 
language and styles themselves.
IV
Styles we notice to be styles are often idiosyncratic or unusual (whether 
deliberately so or not), whereas familiar styles frequently go unnoticed. 
Nonetheless, while we tend to notice unusual styles as style, all language, 
according to Nietzsche, is stylized:
what is called ‘rhetorical,’ as a means of conscious art, had been active as 
a means of unconscious art in language and its development, indeed, that 
the rhetorical is a further development, guided by the clear light of 
the understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in 
language. There is obviously no unrhetorical ‘naturalness’ of language to 
which one could appeal.13
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Nietzsche emphasizes to us that what we take to be non-stylized 
language is simply a common or predominant style of an ethos that seems 
to naturally reﬂect reality, whereas conspicuous or idiosyncratic language 
use is likely to be related to uncommon ethoi, habits and experiences. To 
illustrate this point Nietzsche describes the effect of a writer who has 
different habits to those surrounding her (DB, p. 153). When a member 
of an audience notices peculiarity in the style of a speaker or writer, she is 
noticing, without necessarily being aware of it, that these words are tied 
to an experience and ethos that differs from her own. Conspicuous styles 
emphasize the difference between, and not the common consciousness 
of, the writer/speaker and the reader/listener. Detecting others’ styles 
is to begin noticing their difference. As Eric Blondel writes, to “pinpoint 
how one speaks is to be able to say who is speaking”.14 Nietzsche considers 
the recognition of difference and distance between selves as extremely 
important (HH, p. 275). If one fails to notice another’s style of language, 
one projects one’s style, thought and experience onto it, rendering it the 
same. By doing so one unreﬂectively submits to the generalities inherent 
in words and concepts. 
In thinking of style in this way, Nietzsche makes the audience’s role 
central to questions of style. Contrary to Heidegger, for whom there is 
only one “grand style” that exempliﬁes the metaphysical essence of the 
will to power,15 Nietzsche argues that evaluating and deciding whether a 
style is grand, overt, good, natural, classical and so on can only occur in 
the context of a relationship to an audience and its ethos:  “Good style in 
itself—a piece of pure folly, mere ‘idealism,’ on a level with the ‘beautiful 
in itself,’ the ‘good in itself,’ the ‘thing in itself’” (EH, p. 265). This means 
that, as Derrida rightly notes, that there can only be multiple styles because 
styles only emerge in contrast with each other.16 If a speaker wishes to use 
a modest, inconspicuous style, she will employ the stylistic conventions 
that surround her (GS, p. 211). If a speaker does not trust these prevailing 
styles and norms around her, then she will develop a more complex 
style. In response, the audience trusts styles with which it is familiar and 
distrusts those that seem unusual or affected. 
Accordingly, “the perfect and easy style is permissible only before a 
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perfect audience” (DB, p. 170); it is only perfect in virtue of the context it is 
presented in. Likewise, to speak in a natural style requires a correspondence 
between the speaker’s style and the audience’s ethos, which may require 
the conscious, artistic manipulation of style:
Therefore, in sum, purity and clarity everywhere; but all modiﬁed according 
to the characteristics of place, occasion, speakers, and listeners—the feeling 
for style ... The characteristic style is the proper domain of the art of the 
orator: here he practices a free plastic art; the language is his material; 
which has already been prepared. Here, he is an imitative artist; he speaks 
like an actor who plays a role unfamiliar to him or in an unfamiliar 
situation: here, the belief is basic that each manages his object best, ie., 
works most convincingly in his own manner. It is in this way that the 
listener perceives the naturalness, viz., the absolute appropriateness and 
uniformity, whereas with each derivation from the natural, he perceives the 
artiﬁciality and becomes distrustful about the matter presented. The art 
of the orator is never to allow artiﬁciality to become noticeable: hence the 
characteristic style which, however, is all the more a product of the highest 
art, just like the ‘naturalness’ of the good actor. The true orator speaks forth 
from the ethos of the persons or things represented by him.17
Naturalness of speech is an effect of using the predominant style of the 
audience, one that has arisen from the ethos of the audience. Similarly, 
Nietzsche views classical style not as a particular style in itself, but as a 
certain relationship between the work of a writer, speaker or artist and its 
audience. Classical style relates to its audience by presenting the greatness 
of the audience’s culture and the nobility of its ethos (WP, p. 446-47). 
Merit is not attributed to a style based on whether it is a dominant style 
or not, for while Nietzsche rejects the prevailing German styles around 
him as impoverished in one way or another (HH, p. 332, 334), he approves 
of the dominant style of the Romans and the Greeks (TI, p. 105). This is 
because Nietzsche considers the ancient Greek ethos to be noble, which 
provides the Greek artist with the opportunity to reﬂect this nobility in 
his work and afﬁrm the stylistic conventions of such an ethos (HH, p. 
339).  Whether a style is normative or not cannot alone be a measure of its 
worth and, in turn, an overtly metaphorical style is not, in itself, valuable 
simply because it is metaphorical rather than normative. By this account, a 
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style that is obviously metaphorical could be considered degenerate in the 
context of an ethos that Nietzsche thought to be noble. But in a decedent 
culture the adoption of an overtly metaphorical style can challenge the 
norms of language and engage with its creative origins.
Style is bound to convention and the art of good style does not lie so 
much in the freedom to write any way one chooses, or to write about 
anything one chooses, but rather depends on the writer or speaker’s 
capacity to work within constraints (WP, p. 428, see also HH, pp. 102-4). 
While a relationship to a dominant style may be critical or afﬁrmative, 
this relationship cannot be avoided. Consciously developing style is 
a process of selecting pre-existing words and linguistic forms and the 
“good prose writer employs only words that belong to common speech, 
but by no means all the words that belong to it—this is precisely how 
select or high style originates” (HH, pp. 239-40). When writing or speech 
loses its relationship to surrounding linguistic norms then it appears mad 
or nonsensical, and innovative writers must beware of forfeiting this 
relationship. Exceptions only have meaning in the context of the rule (GS, 
p. 131). For this reason writers must be careful when they change known 
styles: “Progress from one stylistic level to the next must proceed so slowly 
that not only the artists but the auditors and spectators too can participate 
in this process and know exactly what is going on” (HH, p. 89). 
V
There is a glaring omission in my discussion of style so far. Many 
of the above comments by Nietzsche about style relate to oratory, not 
written, style, raising the question of whether the workings of style are 
similar in both types of language use. In my view Nietzsche does think 
that there are important parallels between style in speech and writing, 
although he considers written style as different to and more complex 
than oratory style: 
The art of writing demands above all substitutes for the modes of expression 
available only to the speaker: that is to say for gestures, emphases, tones of 
voice, glances. That is why written style is something quite different from 
oral style and something much more difﬁcult. (HH, p. 336) 
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Devices of communication available to the orator, such as physical 
movements and pitch and tone of voice, are not available to the writer. 
Nietzsche expresses concern about the need to translate the communicative 
techniques of speech into techniques of writing because the “age of 
speaking is past .... everyone who is a good European now has to learn to 
write well and even better” (HH, p. 332).
Some differences between written and spoken style lie beyond the 
repertoire of communicative and rhetorical techniques available to the 
stylist and result from the different experiences of reading and listening. In 
particular, the temporal experience of the audience will differ because an 
orator’s audience listens to a speech just the once whereas a reader has the 
capacity to re-read a written text in her own time.18 The reader’s capacity to 
control her consumption of a text generates a different kind of experience. 
This is reﬂected in Nietzsche’s concern with the activity of his readers, 
activity that a listener could not engage in. As Kathleen Merrow writes, 
Nietzsche’s discussions of rhetoric, particularly Ecce Homo’s invocation of 
the Greek rhetorician Demosthenes with the phrase the “multifarious art 
of style” (EH, p. 265), emphasize the role of pathos, tempo and rhythm.19 
Style is linked to the communication of inward states and pathos considered 
“as an emotional state or condition”. Nietzsche’s discussion of the Greek 
orator Demosthenes describes “his ability to move his audience by stirring 
their emotions” as part of his oratory excellence.20 The quality of deinotês 
(a mastery of all styles that is tied to excellent delivery) associated with 
Demonsthenes is connected to the idea of “persuasion as an uncanny 
sublime force, a force that carries with it a potential fear about the possible 
deceptiveness of appearances”.21 What is important here for our discussion 
of the different experiences of listening and reading is the emphasis on 
the way in which an audience is moved, persuaded or overwhelmed by 
an orator, that is, an emphasis on the passivity of the listener. 
In contrast, Nietzsche does not think that he can simply overwhelm 
and sway all his audience through his writing (GS, p. 230). His discussions 
of the activity of reading explicitly ask for a certain type of reader, the 
slow “ruminating” reader.22 The ruminating reader does not leap hastily 
to conclusions about writing but carefully deciphers a text because “to 
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read well” is “to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, 
with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and ﬁngers” 
(DB, p. 5). Philology is one kind of careful reading because it follows “a 
simple desire to understand what the author is saying” (HH, p. 127). The 
importance of the reader’s activity is one explanation for Nietzsche’s 
preference for the incomplete presentation of ideas because in leaving 
gaps and silence for the reader to ﬁll, he incites his reader to an active 
interpretation (HH, p. 92).
Such reading requires the reader’s respect for the difference and 
unfamiliarity of a text. Nevertheless, Nietzsche also recognizes that all 
reading will involve the ethos and experience of the reader because books 
need to be reanimated by their living readers (HH, p. 242). Although a 
reader might productively seek the author’s meaning, reading never fully 
recreates the author’s original meaning. Nor is this the goal of reading, 
according to Nietzsche, because to understand a work is not only a matter 
of attempting to recreate what the work meant at the point at which it 
was written: “Does one have to understand a work in precisely the way 
in which the age that produced it understood it?  But one takes more 
pleasure in a work, is more astonished by it, and learns more from it, if 
one does not understand it in that way” (DB, p. 205). Developing and 
exploring the possibilities of a text is a central task of reading and in this 
way readers can even improve a book (HH, p. 248). This kind of reading 
requires the reader to be contented with an “uncertainty of ... horizon” 
that leaves “the way to many thoughts” open (HH, p. 96).
This is not to say that the reader completely determines the meaning 
of a text, that the reader has no limits placed on her activity. One of the 
effects of language, employed and discussed by Nietzsche, is a writer’s 
use of style to exclude readers. Nietzsche writes:
One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just 
as surely not to be understood ... by just ‘anybody’. All the nobler spirits 
and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; and 
choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against ‘the others’. All 
the more subtle laws of style have their origin at this point. (GS, p. 343)
Nietzsche clearly states his preference for esoteric books written for 
particular types of readers and dislike of books written for the general 
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population (HH, p. 249 and BGE, p. 61). Yet he is not certain that he will 
encounter readers of the requisite disposition to engage with his works: 
“people will have trouble understanding us. We are looking for words; 
perhaps we are also looking for ears” (GS, pp. 285-86).23 Naive readers 
ignore his styles and the meaning and experience they point towards 
and simply read his work as universal books that communicate the same 
thing to everybody. 
If language that talks to and seems natural within an ethos requires that 
the artiﬁce of the speaker or writer goes unnoticed, then clearly this is not 
Nietzsche’s practice. Nietzsche’s own obvious and multiplicitous styles 
embody his claim that if one distrusts the style surrounding oneself one 
will develop a complex style. His rejection of modernity and its dominant 
rhetorical styles for being degenerate leads him to use numerous complex 
and conspicuous styles in his criticism of the culture surrounding him 
and its language use. For example, he constantly places terms in inverted 
commas in order to indicate that he is not using them in their normative 
conceptual sense, but challenging and shifting their meaning. Blondel 
writes that Nietzsche’s use of inverted comas points to two things: “that 
he is quoting reported words or passages, above all in order to mark a 
difference between his own discourse and a foreign discourse, between 
metalanguage and language” and “to show the gap that exists between 
language in general and his own language”.24 His textual styles highlight 
his presence as an author, emphasizing the connection between his writing 
and his particular experiences and perspectives. Both in his explicit 
discussion and complex use of styles (which, due to his tokenism, are 
often hard to distinguish), Nietzsche challenges the claim that language 
corresponds to a single unchanging reality, and denaturalizes the linguistic 
ethos that surrounded him.
VI
The good writer must re-interpret and re-invent language and its 
meaning through the use of style. Indeed, to a certain extent all selves do 
this, as the linguistic conventions surrounding them can only be interpreted 
in terms of their own ethoi and experiences. Nietzsche’s idea of writing as 
a reinterpretation of language requires that a writer posses a capacity for 
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silence lest she simply reiterate a dominant normative language: “One 
should speak only when one may not stay silent; and then only of that 
which one has overcome—everything else is chatter” (HH, p. 209). One 
must be silent lest one “think like an orator”, that is, have one’s thought 
overly bound to the social conventions of an audience (EH, p. 340). 
Nietzsche even writes of an art that is created without an audience 
in mind, a monologic art created in terms of the self rather than for an 
audience:
The ﬁrst distinction to be made regarding works of art.—All thought, 
poetry, painting, compositions, even buildings and sculptures, belong either 
to monological art or to art before witnesses .... whether he looks at his work 
in progress (at ‘himself’) from the point of view of the witness, or whether 
he ‘has forgotten the world,’ which is the essential feature of all monological 
art. (GS, p. 324)
Art before witnesses includes art or prayer made before the eyes of 
God (DB, p. 194), whereas monologic art is an experience of solitude in 
which men “do not compare themselves with others at all but spin out 
their life of monologue in a calm and cheerful mood, conversing and 
indeed laughing with themselves alone” (HH, p. 197). Inevitably, writing 
or speaking that is “lacking an ear” is a monologue, the “whispering of 
the solitary to himself” (HH, p. 296). Nietzsche identiﬁes his own work as 
monologues (HH, p. 212), expecting no response from an audience to such 
a solitary art and language, but only a critical echo (GS, p. 203). So after 
placing the audience in such a central role in the art of style, Nietzsche 
imagines a kind of writing or speaking that has no audience to persuade 
or reﬂect, that only needs to persuade the speaker or writer herself.
I consider this idea of the monologue to be a useful means of 
understanding the importance of style as a creative and critical approach 
to linguistic norms. A monologue is not concerned with persuading an 
audience of a truth by calling upon the cultures of an audience and its 
normative truths. Such writing deploys style to take up a perspective 
upon the norms and concepts inhering in language itself. Moreover, the 
writer experiencing the whispering or echo of her own writing takes up 
a critical perspective on her own language use, on the experience and 
norms associated with that language. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche quotes 
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heavily from his own works in what could be described as an adoption 
of a perspective on the writing of his own ethos, or an interpretation of 
his own work. To re-invent language when one is a writer is not only to 
reinvent the language of others and its associated experiences, but also to 
take up a perspective on one’s own language use—to take up a perspective 
on one’s own experience and style and, in a sense, to overcome oneself 
(see HH, p. 248). This monologic practice continues Nietzsche’s criticism 
of the idea that language corresponds to an unchanging reality, not only 
because it is a false view of language, but also because such a view of 
language limits our engagement with language’s capacity for expression 
and its complex relationship to experience. 
 In addition to considering Nietzsche’s account of meaning as 
based on concepts established by communal agreement, there is a need 
to also reﬂect on his discussion and use of style if we are to conceive of a 
positive practice of writing. This provides us with an understanding of 
an experience of writing that does not merely reiterate the surrounding 
norms of language that are so readily transformed into metaphysics. Style 
allows the unfamiliar, the diverse, the rare and the changing into language. 
It provides an interpretive perspective on the norms of language, through 
which language and culture can be reinvented. In the experience of reading 
and writing with style, “the words and word shrines of all being open up 
before you; here all being wishes to become word, all becoming wishes 
to learn from you how to speak”.25
I would like to thank Sacha Gibbons for reading and commenting on this 
paper.
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